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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS 
CO., and INTEGON INDEMNITY CORP., 
Defendants. 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff, and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., 
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, 
PETER T. LIN, and W. JAMES PALMER, 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Appellees 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES-THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS 
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, 
PETER T. LIN, AND W. JAMES PALMER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 
1992). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1992), and 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992), this Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal by reason of the transfer of this 
action from the Supreme Court of Utah to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Case No. 920407-CA 
Priority 16 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does the Proprietary/Governmental Function distinction 
apply to agencies of the State of Utah, as opposed to 
municipalities? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
as in the instant action, the Court reviews the facts in a light 
most favorable to the losing party. In deciding whether the trial 
court properly granted judgment as a matter of law, the Court gives 
no deference to the trial court's view of the law, but reviews it 
for correctness. Mountain States Tel, v. Garfield County, 811 P. 2d 
184, 192 (Utah 1991) . 
2. Does the definition of governmental function found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (1989) apply to the instant action? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
3. Are the challenged actions of the state defendants done in 
furtherance of an essential core function of government? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
4. Did the trial court correctly dismiss the third party 
plaintiff's state law causes of action due to his failure to file 
an undertaking as required by § 63-30-19 (1989)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is tne same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
5. Were Mr. Karren's state law tort claims against the 
Division of Water Resources and its employees in their 
2 
representative capacities properly dismissed based on the retention 
of immunity found at § 63-30-10 (1989)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
6. Were Mr. Karren's state law negligence claims against 
state officers Lin and Palmer correctly dismissed pursuant to the 
immunity provided by § 63-30-4(4) (1989)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
7. Did Mr. Karren fail to state a cause of action for fraud? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
8. Did Mr. Karren fail to state a cause of action for 
malicious conversion of property? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
9. Did Mr. Karren fail to state a cause of action for 
interference with prospective economic relations? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
10. Did Mr. Karren fail to state a cause of action for 
interference with contractual relations? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
11. Does a private, non-statutory, civil, cause of action 
exist to redress alleged violations of Article 12, Section 19 of 
3 
the Utah State Constitution? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
12. Did Mr. Karren fail to state a cause of action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against state officers Lin and Palmer? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
13. Was the State of Utah's sovereign immunity waived for Mr. 
Karren's contract claims? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
14. Was Mr. Karren, doing business as Rock Products, a third-
party beneficiary of the State of Utah's contract with Richards 
Irrigation Co.? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Standard of Review is the same as 
that for the first issue, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (1989): 
(4)(a) "Governmental function" means any act, 
failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking of a governmental entity whether 
or not the act, failure to act, operation, 
function, or undertaking is characterized as 
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental 
function, unique to government, undertaken in 
a dual capacity, essential to or not essential 
to a government or governmental function, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or 
private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed 
by any department, agency, employee, agent, or 
officer of a governmental entity. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 (1989) 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff 
shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by 
the court, but in no case less than the sum of 
$300, conditioned upon the payment by the 
plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the 
governmental entity in the action if the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action' or 
fails to recover judgment. 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-3Q-10(1)(a), (b), (d)-(f) (1989) 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused; or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of 
process, libel, slander, deceit, interference 
with contract rights, infliction of mental 
anguish, or civil rights; or . . . 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an 
inspection or by reason of making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection of any 
property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or 
prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without 
probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the 
employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional; . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, Ves A. Karren, doing 
business as Rock Products Company, filed the instant third party 
complaint against the State of Utah's Division of Water Resources, 
two state employees, Richards Irrigation Co., and the owners of the 
real property serviced by Richards Irrigation Co.. R. 485-767. 
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Upon the state third party defendants motion for summary judgment1 
(R. 813-884), the matter was dismissed as to the state defendants. 
R. 1773-1777. Since that time the action has continued against the 
other parties, but has now been concluded. R. 2502-2504. Third 
Party Plaintiff now brings the instant appeal only from the 
dismissal of the state defendants. R. 2507-2508. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, Ves A. Karren, doing 
business as Rock Products Company, entered into an agreement with 
the Plaintiff, Richards Irrigation Co., to install a pressurized 
water system for Richards. R. 490, para. 9. 
Richards Irrigation Company, through a separate agreement, had 
contracted with the State of Utah's Board of Water Resources for 
the State of Utah to partially (85%) finance the construction of 
Richard's irrigation system. R. 873-884. Pursuant to its contract 
with Richards, the State of Utah engineered the water system. R. 
507, para. 58. The specifications prepared by the State of Utah 
were included as part of the contract between Richards and Karren, 
the appellant. R. 492, para. 12. 
As of the date of Karren's third party complaint, Karren, dba 
as Rock Products Company, had been paid $438,248.85 under his 
construction contract with Richards. R. 494, para. 16. Richards 
Irrigation Co. possesses and uses the irrigation system in 
1
 While styled a Motion to Dismiss, the State Defendants 
Motion included materials outside of the pleadings and was properly 
treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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question. R. 505, para, 21. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Karren, doing business as Rock Products Co., was hired by 
Richards Irrigation Co. as a contractor to install a pressurized 
water system for Richards. When Karren and Richards disputed how 
much money was due for the work, Richards brought the instant 
action against Karren. Karren brought the amended third party 
complaint at question, not only against Richards, but also against 
the State of Utah's Division of Water Resources and two state 
employees. 
Though the actions of the state defendants were governmental 
in nature, Karren never filed the requisite undertaking. The 
various tort causes of action Karren brought against the Division 
all fall within one or more of the exceptions to waiver of immunity 
found in § 63-30-10 (1989). The negligence actions against the two 
state employees also fail due to the immunity provided for state 
officers. 
Karren sought to raise four causes of action against the two 
state officers alleging fraud and malice, in an effort to 
circumvent their immunity, but failed to state a cause of action 
upon which relief could be ordered on any of those four claims. 
While Karren had no contract with the State of Utah, he sought 
to circumvent the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by claiming he was 
a third party beneficiary of the Board of Water Resources (a non-
party) contract with Richards Irrigation. Karren is not such a 
beneficiary and his contract claims were properly dismissed. 
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Karren sought to bring an action directly under Article 12, 
Section 19 of the Utah State Constitution, even though the very 
-language of that provision declares that the legislature would have 
the power to determine how it should be enforced. The legislature 
has created a criminal enforcement procedure for the provision at 
question, and no civil cause of action such as Karren's exists. 
Karren's efforts to raise a contractual dispute with Richards 
to the level of a constitutional violation was correctly dismissed 
by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS 
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT ACTION 
A. The Proprietary/Governmental Function Distinction 
Does Not Apply to the State of Utah and its Agencies 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act broadened the liability of 
governmental entities. See Standiford v. Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 
1230, 1235 (Utah 1980) (recognizing principle). Before the Act's 
adoption, however, the State was absolutely immune from tort 
liability at common law. See Wilkinson v. State, 134 P. 626, 630 
(Utah 1913) ("in the absence of either express constitutional or 
statutory authority an action against a sovereign state cannot be 
maintained"); Campbell Bldq. Co. v. State Road Comih'n., 7 0 P. 2d 
857, 861 (Utah 1937) ("action may not be maintained [against the 
State Road Commission] unless the State has, through legislative or 
constitutional action, given consent to be sued"); State v. 
District Court, 78 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1937) ("the state cannot be 
sued unless it has given its consent or has waived immunity"); 
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Bingham v. Board of Education, 223 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1950) 
("without legislative enactment we are unable to impose any 
liability or obligation upon [departments of the state]"). 
In arguing that the Governmental Immunity Act does not apply, 
Third Party Plaintiff argues that the actions of the State of Utah 
in question were proprietary in nature, and therefore not entitled 
to immunity at all. This argument fails because the State of Utah 
has never been held to act in a proprietary manner. Its actions 
have always been considered governmental functions that were immune 
from suit at common law. 
The proprietary/governmental function distinction, at common 
law, was applied only to municipal corporations, which were 
regarded as having a dual character and were accorded immunity only 
when acting as an agent of the state, i.e., in a governmental 
capacity, rather than as a private corporation, i.e., in a 
proprietary capacity. See Note, Tort Claims Against the State of 
Utah, 5 Utah L. Rev. 233, 236-37 (1956); Crowder v. Salt Lake 
County, 552 P.2d 646, 647 (Utah 1976) ("prior to 1965, actions for 
negligence could not have been maintained against the State or its 
political subdivisions for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe 
or dangerous condition of any road or bridge except 
municipalities"); Bingham v. Board of Education, 223 P. 2d 432, 435 
(Utah 1950) (recognizing dual character of municipal corporations 
and stating that " [i]f the city should be regarded as a state 
agency at all times, . . . there would exist no logical ground for 
holding it liable for damages due to negligence, since in no 
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instance is a state held liable under the general principles of 
law"). See also Hale v. Port of Portland, 783 P.2d 506 (Or. 1989) 
(holding damages cap conflicted with state open courts provision as 
applied to municipality, but not as applied to state); Prosser and 
Keaton, The Law of Torts, pp. 1043 & 1051 (5th ed. 1984) (at common 
law state entities were absolutely immune from suit, while 
municipalities were granted immunity only for governmental, as 
opposed to proprietary, activities); Restatement of Torts § 887, 
comment c (1939) (only the state has complete immunity from tort 
liability; municipal corporations are immune only for governmental 
functions). 
Thus, to the extent Mr. Karren (appellant) seeks to apply the 
proprietary/governmemtal function distinction to a state entity in 
this matter, third party plaintiff has erred. The Governmental 
Immunity Act applies to the instant action, including the 
procedural requirements such as the need to file an undertaking 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 (1989) 
B. The Definition of Governmental Function Found at Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) is Applicable to the Instant 
Action 
As originally enacted, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act did 
not include a definition of the term "governmental function." This 
state of affairs led the Supreme Court of Utah to state that "the 
governmental-proprietary classification system has had a checkered 
history before this Court." Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 
1980). In its 1987 General Session, the Utah State Legislature 
took strong measures to reaffirm, clarify, and resolve the disputes 
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over what the meaning of "governmental function" should be. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) was amended to read: 
(4)(a) "Governmental function" means any act, 
failure to act, operation, function,
 m or 
undertaking of a governmental entity whether 
or not the act, failure to act, operation, 
function, or undertaking is characterized as 
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental 
function, unique to government, undertaken in 
a dual capacity, essential to or not essential 
to a government or governmental function, or 
could be performed by private enterprise or 
private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed 
by any department, agency, employee, agent, or 
officer of a governmental entity. 
Mr. Karren (Rock Products) claims that this statutory 
definition of governmental function should not apply to the instant 
action because, while it was enacted before the filing of the 
instant action, the cause of action arose before the effective date 
of the statute. While citing several cases on this question, Mr. 
Karren has failed to cite to the decision of the Utah Supreme Court 
that is controlling. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). 
Frank involved a previous attempt by the legislature to 
correct the Supreme Court's efforts to interpret the phrase 
"governmental function." The statute at question in Frank, 
declared that all government health care facilities were to be 
considered to be fulfilling governmental functions. As in the 
instant action, the statute at question in Frank was enacted after 
the cause of action had arisen. 
While the amended reenactment of the provision 
in question was not made expressly 
retroactive, and the present action arose 
prior to its passage, we are disinclined, a-s a 
matter of judicial policy, to disregard the 
11 
obvious manifestation of legislative intent 
reflected in the amendment. 
Id. at 519. The trial court correctly reached the same result in 
the instant action. The legislature, by passing a clear and 
precise definition of "governmental function," has provided an 
obvious manifestation of its intent. As in Franks that intent 
should not be ignored, but should be followed. The 1987 amendment 
to Section 63-30-2 is the Legislature's first formal definition of 
"governmental function."2 It reflects the Legislature's 
longstanding view that "governmental function" should be construed 
broadly, and that exceptions to immunity be narrowly and strictly 
construed* 
Because all of the complained of actions of the state 
defendants fall within the statutory definition of "governmental 
function" that has been provided by the legislature, the 
Governmental Immunity Act applies to all of the third party 
plaintiff's state law causes of action. 
C. The Challenged Actions of the State Defendants Were 
Essential to the Core of Governmental Activity 
Even disregarding the definition of "governmental function" 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (1989), the challenged 
activities of the State of Utah's Division of Water Resources were 
the exercise of a governmental function. Utah is a dry state in 
which water is a scarce and very important resource. "The 
2
 In 1987 (as noted in Frank) and again in 1984 and 1985, the 
Legislature amended Section 63-30-3 to clarify that governmental 
health care, and floodwater and natural-disaster management are 
governmental functions, but Section 63-30-2(4) is the first formal 
definition of governmental function. 
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conservation of water and power resources of the state for the 
benefit of the people is unquestionably a governmental function of 
great importance•" Petition of Board of Directors, 86 P.2d 460, 
464 (Or. 1939) (sovereign immunity not at issue). If the water of 
the State of Utah were not properly managed by the appropriate 
governmental agencies over public water resources, vital needs 
would suffer. The essential role of government is to forestall 
such problems. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-10-1 (1989) sets forth the Utah State 
Legislature's policy declarations of the governmental need to 
provide funding and assistance to build water projects, such as the 
one in question in the instant action, that would more frugally use 
the scarce water resources of the state and permit conservation of 
those resources. Indeed, the legislature has stated that projects 
such as the one at issue were necessary to provide for the economic 
growth of the state. Utah Code Ann. § 73-10a-23(l) (1989). 
The challenged actions of the Division of Water Resources, and 
its employees, were in furtherance of a necessary governmental 
function, as determined by the Utah State Legislature. For this 
reason, also, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act applied to the 
instant action. 
II. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S STATE LAW CAUSES 
OF ACTION WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE 
TO COMPLY WITH THE UNDERTAKING REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACTf S 63-30-19 
Third Party Plaintiff's state law claims are subject to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-19 (1989), which provides: 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff 
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shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by 
the court, but in no case less than the sum of 
$300, conditioned upon the payment by the 
plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the 
governmental entity in the action if the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or 
fails to recover judgment. 
Where, as here, suit is brought against an agency of the State 
of Utah, and its employees, a condition precedent to bringing suit 
is the filing of the statutorily mandated undertaking. If this is 
not done, suit is barred. 
While not binding upon this Court, the State of Utah calls 
this Court's attention to the decision of the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Rippstein v. City of Provo, 929 F.2d 576 (10th Cir. 
1991). In Rippstein, the federal appellate court held that the 
undertaking required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 must be filed 
contemporaneously with the complaint in order to be timely filed 
under this statute. Because the plaintiff in Rippstein did not so 
file an undertaking, but only sought to file one at a later time, 
the action was dismissed. The Court held that the failure to file 
could not be remedied by an attempt to file an undertaking late. 
At no time in the instant action, did third party plaintiff 
seek to file the required undertaking. For this reason, the third 
party plaintiff's claims against the State of Utah third party 
defendants were properly dismissed. 
III. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S STATE TORT LAW 
CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE DIVISION OF WATER 
RESOURCES WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BASED ON THE 
IMMUNITY OF THE STATE PROVIDED BY THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, S 63-30-10 
Third party plaintiff's state law causes of actions can be 
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divided into two groups; contract claims and tort claims. The tort 
claims raised by the third party plaintiff include; negligent 
misrepresentation, intentional trespass (conversion of property), 
fraud, and interference with contractual rights. The Division of 
Water Resources is, pursuant to § 63-30-10 (1989) entitled to 
immunity on all of these claims. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused; or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of 
process, libel, slander, deceit, interference 
with contract rights, infliction of mental 
anguish, or civil rights; or . . . 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an 
inspection or by reason of making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection of any 
property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or 
prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without 
probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the 
employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional; . . . . 
Third Party Plaintiff's claims that a state defendant 
negligently and intentionally misrepresented facts on which Karren 
relied clearly falls within the retention of immunity of § 63-30-
10(1) (f) (1989). Any claim that the conduct of the state 
defendants interfered with the contract rights of the third party 
plaintiff falls within the retention of immunity of § 63-30-
10(1)(b) (1989). Any claim that the state defendants conspired to 
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convert the property of the third party plaintiff falls within the 
retention of immunity of § 63-30-10(1)(b) (1989) for injuries 
arising out of intentional trespass. Any claim for fraud against 
the state defendants falls within the retention of immunity of § 
63-30-10(1)(b) (1989) for injuries arising out of deceit. 
The Governmental Immunity Actf Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et 
seq., does not contain a waiver of immunity for intentional torts 
(such as fraud, intemtional trespass, etc.). Any claims that the 
third party plaintiff was damaged as a result of intentional torts 
cannot state a claim against the State of Utah, or its Division of 
Water Resources. 
Because the Division of Water Resources is immune from the 
third party plaintiff's state tort law causes of action, the state 
employees in their representative capacity are also immune. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4) (1989). For these reasons, Mr. Karren's 
state tort law claims against the Division and the state employees 
in their representative capacities were properly dismissed. 
IV. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S STATE TORT LAW 
CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST PETER T. LIN AND W. 
JAMES PALMER, EMPLOYEES OF THE DIVISION OF 
WATER RESOURCES WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BASED 
ON THE IMMUNITY PROVIDED BY THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, S 63-30-4 AND 
BECAUSE THE THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED 
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THESE THIRD 
PARTY DEFENDANTS 
Pursuant to § 63-30-4(4) (1989), third party defendants Lin 
and Palmer can only be sued in their personal capacities if they 
have personally acted, or failed to act, due to fraud or malice. 
The only causes of action in the third party complaint that allege 
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such fraud or malice against one or both of these defendants are: 
First Cause of Action for conspiracy to defraud against Lin, Fourth 
Cause of Action for conspiracy to convert property'against Lin, 
Seventh Cause of Action for interference with prospective economic 
relations against Palmer, and the Ninth Cause of Action for 
tortious interference with contractual relations against Palmer. 
All other causes of action against these defendants were properly 
dismissed due to the immunity that these defendants enjoy. 
In determining whether a complaint states facts upon which 
relief may be granted, courts consider only the facts alleged; and 
the facts must be stated with particularity to show how they 
constitute a cause of action. Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 991 
(Utah 1962). As a matter of law, third party plaintiff has failed 
to state a cause of action against third party defendants Lin and 
Palmer as to these four cause of action that do allege fraud or 
malice. 
In seeking to avoid his duty to plead with particularity, Mr. 
Karren relies upon Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for 
the proposition that he only needed to provide notice. This 
reliance is misplaced. Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure expressly states that "in all averments of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be 
stated with particularity." See also, Heathman, supra, and DeBrv 
v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Utah App. 1992). 
A. Conspiracy to Defraud. 
The allegation of "fraud" is a legal conclusion entitled to no 
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deference against a motion to dismiss, Heathman, supra, and Mr. 
Karren failed to state a cause of action because the elements of 
fraud are absent. 
A claim for fraud requires: (1) That a representation was 
made; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which 
was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, 
or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge 
upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, 
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact 
rely upon jLt; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury 
and damage. Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 
(Utah 1982) . 
Mr. Karren's first cause of action fails to state several 
elements of fraud. The alleged misrepresentation (presence of an 
inspector to measure sand being used) was not "material" because is 
was not part of the contract. Karren had no right to rely upon the 
representation because the contract called for no inspector to be 
present. The purpose of the alleged representation (presence of 
the inspector) was not to induce Karren to act differently from how 
he would otherwise have been required to at. Karren's reliance 
thereon was not reasonable. 
B. Conspiracy to Convert Property. 
Karren claims that Richards Irrigation Co. converted his 
property by trying to use the system that Karren had installed for 
Richards. The system runs underground to the lands owned by 
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Richards shareholders, and irrigates those lands. Somehow, Karren 
claims that a state employee was a malicious participant to this 
effort at conversion. Karren had installed the water system for 
Richards, it was never his intent to use the system himself. 
Karren has failed to state a cause of action. The system, once 
installed, became a fixture on the land, and Karren. owns none of 
that land. By analogy, under Karren's theory, every contractor who 
built an addition onto an existing structure, would become the 
owner of the addition. 
C. Interference with Prospective Economic Relations 
Karren's claim for interference with prospective economic 
relations is based on the claim that Mr. Palmer, a state employee, 
removed Karren's company, Rock Products, from the Division of Water 
Resources "pre-qualified potential contractor list." The 
prospective economic relations allegedly interfered with were with 
the very state agency whose conduct is challenged. 
The first mortal problem with this claim is that the action 
only allegedly removed third party plaintiff from a list of pre-
qualified contractors, leaving Mr. Karren free to qualify, bid, and 
receive contracts. 
Next, the alleged "conduct is not actionable . . . if the 
defendant only acted to protect his own legitimate interests." 
Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel., 709 P.2d 330, 337 
(Utah 1985). Even assuming the purpose Karren alleges for the 
letter, it was done only to resolve a continuing problem between 
Karren and Richards concerning a water project in which the State 
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of Utah had an interest. It was a legitimate action to protect the 
State of Utah's interests and resources and to get the project 
finished and the dispute settled. 
Finally, since the letter was not alleged to have been 
disseminated to third persons, it did not harm Karren regardless of 
its purpose. That is, the letter did not interfere with Karren's 
economic relations because no one else knew about it. Karren's own 
allegation is that the letter's purpose was to bring about a 
resolution of the disputes between Karren and Richards Irrigation -
not to injure Karren's prospective economic relations. Such an 
intent is not improper. 
D. Interference with Contractual Relations 
This claim fails for the same reasons stated above in subpart 
C. The alleged state conduct was to protect legitimate state 
interests, and therefore is not actionable. Atkin, 709 P. 2d at 
337. 
In addition, Karren can state no claim here because Karren 
admittedly had no contract that was interfered with. Karren 
instead alleges that he would have been able to enter into a 
contract but for the state action. There can be no interference 
with a contract, if there is no contract. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, section 766 (1979); Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 602-03 
(Utah 1962). 
Further, "if a party has an interest to protect, he is 
privileged to prevent performance of a contract which threatens 
it." Soter v. Wasatch Development Corp.y 443 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 
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1968). 
The alleged incident was that Karren was unable to obtain a 
contract as a subcontractor on a state project. The State was duly 
concerned about working with Karren, because of the recent problems 
on the Richards project. State financing and resources were again 
involved, and the State of Utah had a legitimate interest to 
protect. The state defendants' alleged interference was therefore 
privileged. Karren had no "right" to contract with the State of 
Utah. 
V. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A CAUSE 
OF ACTION FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 12, 
SECTION 19 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
Karren's Thirteenth Cause of Action seeks to allege a private, 
civil, cause of action for a purported violation of Article 12, 
Section 19 of the Utah State Constitution, which stated:3 
Every person in this State shall be free to 
obtain employment whenever possible, and any 
person, corporation, or agent, servant or 
employee thereof, maliciously interfering or 
hindering in any way, any person from 
obtaining or enjoying employment already 
obtained, from any other corporation or 
person, shall be deemed guilty of a crime. 
The Legislature shall provide by law for the 
enforcement of this section. 
Even disregarding sovereign immunity, Karren Has failed to 
state a cause of action under this constitutional provision. The 
3
 The last sentence of this section was stricken by a 
constitutional amendment proposed in S.J.R. 7, Laws of 1992. This 
amendment was approved by the voters of this state in the 1992 
general election and took effect on January 1, 1993. The fact that 
the legislature and the voters thought this sentence significant 
enough to require its repeal, would indicate that it must be given 
effect in actions which arose when the sentence was still in 
effect. 
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provision is not self executing. It clearly calls upon the 
legislature to provide for its enforcement. The Legislature 
responded by enacting criminal sanctions for violations of this 
provision, not civil ones. Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-24-1 & 2 (1988). 
The Utah State Legislature, and not Mr. Karren, was given the 
constitutional mandate to determine how to enforce Article 12, 
Section 19. That Mr. Karren wishes that the Legislature had 
provided a civil remedy is of no consequence. 
In an effort to avoid the plain language of the constitutional 
provision he relies upon, Mr. Karren looks to federal law and 
claims that the direct causes of action can be created under the 
state constitution in the same manner as the United States Supreme 
Court has created such actions under the federal constitution. 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur, of Narc, 
403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), the Court did, indeed, create 
a federal cause of action directly under the constitution for 
damages against a federal officer who violates an individual's 
constitutional rights. At no time did Bivens create any cause of 
action against state officers or employees. 
Indeed, not all federal officers are susceptible to Bivens 
actions. In Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362 
(1983), the Court refused to create a Bivens action' for enlisted 
military personnel against their superior officers. In reaching 
this decision, the Court explained: 
This Court's holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
supra, authorized a suit for damages against 
federal officials whose actions violate an 
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individual's constitutional rights, eyen 
though Congress had not expressly authorized 
such suits. The Court, in Bivens and its 
progeny, has expressly cautioned, however, 
that such a remedy will not be available when 
"special factors counselling hesitation" are 
present. 
462 U.S. at 298. In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 19, 100 S.Ct. 1468 
(1980) the Court explained that a second reason for not creating 
such a direct cause of action judicially was where the legislature 
had explicitly acted and created a substitute cause of action. 
In the instant case, the Utah State Legislature has done just 
that. The constitutional provision, at all times relevant hereto, 
left its enforcement to the legislature. The legislature acted and 
established a method by which this constitutional provision could 
be enforced. Mr. Karren asks this Court to disregard the plain 
language of the constitutional provision, disregard the 
legislature's establishment of a process to enforce this provision, 
and to disregard the various special factors outlined above that 
counsel hesitation. This the Court should not do. No private 
civil cause of action can be stated pursuant to this constitutional 
provision. 
VI. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF 42 
U.S.C. S 1983 AGAINST LIN AND PALMER 
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that not 
every alleged injury arises to the level of a violation of a 
constitutional right. Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986); 
Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986). When presented with 
civil rights claims that sound simply in tort or contract, courts 
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should "bear in mind Chief Justice Marshall's admonition that 'we 
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding,'" 
Daniels, supra, at 665 (emphasis in original). 
Karren does not even state sustainable tort and contract 
claims, much less constitutional ones. Karren simply alleges an 
incomplete claim for fraud based on the underlying contract between 
Karren and Richards Irrigation Co., and that the State of Utah 
decided not to employ Karren in the future until prior contract 
disputes with Richards had been settled. 
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Karren would have to 
be able to show as a matter of law that the State "deliberately 
deprived [Karren] of his constitutional rights," Wade v. Havnes, 
663 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1981). This Karren cannot do. No 
constitutional right of Karren has been violated. 
Section 1983 does not make "every alleged injury which may 
have been inflicted by a state official acting under 'color of law' 
into a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ." Parratt v. 
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544. The Constitution is not "a font of tort 
law." Id. The Court "do[es] not think that the drafters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment intended [it] to play such a role in our 
society." Id. 
There is no basis here for a Section 1983 action. In 
Coastland Corp. v. County of Currituck, 734 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 
1984), the court rejected a similar effort to raise a contractual 
dispute with a county to the level of a constitutional claim. 
Even if there were facts in the record under 
which Coastland could be considered a third-
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party beneficiary, there would be no process 
due since a suit for breach of contract would 
have provided Coastland with an adequate 
remedy in state law. 
"A mere breach of contractual right is not a deprivation of 
property without constitutional due process of law.* Otherwise, 
virtually every controversy involving an alleged breach of contract 
by a government • . . would be a constitutional case." Jiminez v. 
Almodovar, 650 F.2d 363, 370 (1st Cir. 1981), citing Bishop v. 
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976) (emphasis in original). 
Karren does not have a constitutional right to be employed 
by the State of Utah. The State of Utah, looking at ongoing 
problems between Karren and Richards Irrigation Co., did not 
violate any constitutional right of Karren's by determining that 
it would not contract with Karren until the prior disputes were 
settled. The same can be said of the allegations of state 
complicity in the alleged fraud worked upon Karren by an employee 
of Richards Irrigation. 
VII. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAINTAIN 
ITS CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE 
A. Sovereign Immunity has not been Waived for Karren's 
Contract Claims. 
One of the Legislature's few waivers of immunity 
relates to State contracts. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (1989). 
But it does not apply here. That Section waives immunity only as 
to the State's "contractual obligations]." Since Karren has no 
contract with any of the State Defendants, Rock cannot invoke 
25 
that waiver/ The State's only contract was the one between the 
Board of Water Resources ("Board") and Richards Irrigation 
Company ("Richards"). Rock's contract was with Richards. (The 
contract between Richards and the Board will be called the "Board 
contract," and the contract between Richards and Rock Products 
will be called the "construction contract." The Board contract 
is in the record at R. 873-884) 
The Legislature never intended to waive immunity under 
Section 63-30-5 except as to one who has privity of contract with 
the government, or who specifically is the contract's intended 
beneficiary. Karren enjoys no privity with the State, and was 
not the reason the Board and Richards contracted. Since Karren 
has no enforceable rights under the Board contract, Karren cannot 
use Section 63-30-5 to sue under that contract. There has been 
no waiver of immunity, and Karren cannot maintain its contractual 
claims against the State Defendants. 
B. Karren was not a Third-Party Beneficiary, and Lacks 
Standing to Sue the State, 
Karren seeks to make the State contractually liable merely 
upon the self-serving legal conclusion asserted in paragraph 11 
of his Complaint: "Rock Products was a Third-Party beneficiary 
under the Division fi.e., Board] Contract by virtue of becoming 
the successful bidder and contractor with respect to the System." 
A
 Section 63-30-5 states: "Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation. 
Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall not 
be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 
63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19." 
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R. 492. In addition to being barred by sovereign immunity, 
Karren's claim contradicts all that the Utah Supreme Court has 
said about third-party beneficiary rights. 
As a matter of law, Rock Products and Mr. Karren were not 
third-party beneficiaries. "Third-party beneficiaries are 
'persons who are recognized as having enforceable rights created 
in them by a contract to which they are not parties and for which 
they give no consideration.'" Rio Alqom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 
P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980), quoting 4 Corbin on Contracts section 
774 at 6 (1960). The Supreme Court has strictly held a narrow 
view of third-party claims. "For a third-party beneficiary to 
have a right to enforce a right, the intention of the contracting 
parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit upon the third-
party must be clear." Rio Alqom, supra, at 506. "A third-party 
beneficiary who is incidentally benefited may not recover." Id. 
Rock Product was and is, at most, an incidental beneficiary 
(the incidental benefit being only that Rock Product earned money 
by working as the project contractor—but even that benefit 
accrued under the construction contract, not the Board Contract). 
Rock Product does not qualify. To qualify as a third-party 
beneficiary, the contract must be "intended to benefit him 
directly." Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453, 
454 (Utah 1981). One who is only incidentally benefited "may not 
maintain an action against the promisor," .id, for "he is a 
stranger to the promise and may assert no rights thereunder." 
Tracy Collins Bank v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1982), 
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citing Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 414 
(1968), and Restatement of Contracts (2d) (hereinafter 
"Restatement"), section 315 (1981). 
Richards wanted to build a pressurized irrigation system, 
and the Board agreed, under the Board contract, to partially 
finance the system and to have the Division engineer it. The 
project was planned, specifications were made, and bids for the 
construction work were invited and received. Karren, doing 
business as Rock Products had his bid accepted, Rock' Products 
signed its contract with Richards, and Rock Products began to act 
as the contractor. 
The purpose of the Board contract was to build an irrigation 
system that Richards shareholders could use, and which would help 
conserve the limited water supply available to the public. Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-10-1 (1989). The Board contract absolutely did 
not have the primary purpose of benefiting Rock Products. (For 
that matter, neither did the construction contract, to which Rock 
Products was a party.) In fact, when the Board contract was 
executed, the parties were not even thinking of Rock Products, 
much less intending to make Rock Products the contact's primary 
beneficiary. The Board contract was in place before bids were 
invited, and long before it was known that Rock Products' bid 
would be accepted. In no way was Rock Products the primary or 
intended beneficiary of the contract. Rock Products was simply 
the hired worker. The Supreme Court's decisions roundly reject 
the assertion that someone in Rock Products' place could be a 
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third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce the Board contract. 
Many of the Court's decisions quote or refer to the 
Restatement, and, so far as we can tell/ each of those decisions 
accords with the Restatement's summary of the law. 
The Restatement distinguishes "an 'intended' beneficiary, 
who acquires a right by virtue of a promise, from an 'incidental' 
beneficiary, who does not." Section 302, comment a. The 
definition of "intended" beneficiary is narrow, and anyone who 
somehow benefits from a contract but who cannot qualify as an 
intended beneficiary is automatically only an incidental 
beneficiary.5 
As the Restatement explains, "Performance of a contract will 
often benefit a third person. But unless the third person is an 
intended beneficiary as here defined, no duty to him is created." 
Restatement section 302, comment e. And, "[a]n incidental 
beneficiary acquires by virtue of the promise no right against 
3Restatement section 302, "Intended and Incidental 
Beneficiaries," states: 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a 
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition 
of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to 
effectuate the intention of the parties and either 
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an 
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the 
beneficiary; or 
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends 
to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised 
performance. 
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an 
intended beneficiary. 
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the promisor or the promisee." Restatement section 315. 
Several illustrations under Restatement section 302 show 
that Rock Product has no cause of action here. See, e.g.. 
illustration 3 to comment b,6 and illustration 19 to comment e.7 
And the Court in Schwinqhammer, supra, at 446 P.2d 416, offers 
another analogous illustration in which the incidental 
beneficiary was "held to have no right,"8 as does Mason v. 
Tooele City, 26 Utah 2d 6, 484 P.2d 153 (1971), also discussed in 
6
 "B promises A to pay whatever debts A may incur in a 
certain undertaking. A incurs in the undertaking debts to C, D and 
E. If the promise is interpreted as a promise that B will pay C, 
D and E, they are intended beneficiaries under Subsection (l)(a); 
if the money is to be paid to A in order that he may be provided 
with money to pay C, D and E, they are at most incidental 
beneficiaries." (Emphasis added.) 
7
 "A contracts to erect a building for C. B then contracts 
with A to supply lumber needed for the building. C is an 
incidental beneficiary of B's promise, and B is an incidental 
beneficiary of C's promise to pay A for the building." 
8
 The Court stated: "Corbin illustrates an 'incidental 
beneficiary' in Section 779D, pp. 43-46, in the following language: 
Where A owes money to a creditor C, or to several 
creditors, and B promises A to supply him with money 
necessary to pay such debts, no creditor can maintain 
suit against B on this promise. The same is true in any 
case where A is under a contractual duty to C the 
performance of which requires labor or materials, and B 
promises A to supply him such labor or material; C has no 
action against B on this promise. In such cases the 
performance promised by B does not itself discharge A's 
duty to C or in any other way affect the legal relations 
of C. It may, indeed, tend towards C's getting what A 
owes him, since it supplies A with the money or material 
that will enable A to perform, but such a result requires 
the intervening voluntary action of A. B's performance 
may take place in full without C's ever getting any 
performance by A or receiving any benefit whatever. In 
such cases, therefore, C is called an "incidental" 
beneficiary and is held to have no right." 
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the margin. 
Rock Products also mentions Hamill v. Maryland Cas. Co., 209 
F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954), which applied New Mexico law and noted 
that "an incidental beneficiary may not" recover. Id. at 341. 
Although that case found a third-party beneficiary, it is so 
dissimilar that it does not help Rock.10 
"Certainly [Rock Products] is entitled to no greater rights, 
even viewing it as a third-party beneficiary, than it has as an 
actual party," Rio Alaom, supra, at 506, and since the State 
Defendants have not breached the Board contract with Richards, 
Rock Products would have no cause of action even if it were a 
third-party beneficiary. Indeed, since Rock Products has no 
contract with the State Defendants and is not a third-party 
beneficiary, Rock Products lacks standing to sue. Moreover, Rock 
Products has not even sued the State entity (The Board of Water 
9In Mason, the State and the city contracted to extend a sewer 
line. The contract provided that it was "to enable the City and 
adjacent City property owners to connect to this sewer line at 
later dates.* * *" "Connections to the sewer line by ten (10) 
private individuals will be authorized at the rate of $176.25 per 
building unit, payable in advance for each connection." JIcl. at 484 
P. 2d 154. That contract language specifically referred to third 
parties like Mason (unlike the Board contract, which does not refer 
to Rock). But the Court correctly held the contract was "between 
the City and the Road Commission relating to covering the expenses 
of the water and sewer lines between themselves, and there is 
nothing therein shown expressing an intent that it was to benefit 
the plaintiff or other users* * *." The Mason Court therefore 
disallowed the third-party claim. 
10
 In Hamill, the third-party beneficiary, a surety, provided 
bond to the parties upon the specific inducement of the contract 
which constituted "an available asset . . . on which Maryland 
relied when it executed the . . . bond." 209 F.2d at 341. This is 
far different from the instant case. 
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Resources) that contracted with Richards, Rock Products' 
Complaint was properly dismissed and such dismissal should be 
affirmed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Karren's third party 
complaint against the State of Utah's Division of Water Resources 
and state officers Lin and Palmer. The State Defendants urge 
this Court to affirm the trial court's .order of dismissal• 
Respectfully submitted this / ' 8 ^ d a y of March, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellees-Third Party Defendants Division 
of Water Resources, Peter T. Lin, and W. James Palmer, postage 
prepaid, to the following counsel of record on this the X 
day of March, 1993: 
DAVID L. BARCLAY 
NATHAN R. HYDE 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS 
CO., and INTEGON INDEMNITY CORP., 
Defendants. 




THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., 
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, 
PETER T. LIN, W. JAMES PALMER, 
et al., 
Third-Party Defendants, 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C87-2390 
Judge David S. Young 
- 1 -
r*f *+i O 
{ ( C 
On January 25, 1988, pursuant to notice, the Court conducted 
a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss filed in this case by Third-
Party Defendants Utah Division of Water Resources, W. James Palm-
er
 f and Peter T. Lin ("State Defendants"). 
1. Having carefully considered the pleadings, the memoranda 
and cases submitted, and the arguments of counsel, and being ful-
ly advised in the premises, the Court finds and holds that as a 
matter of law Rock Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint fails 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the 
State Defendants. 
2. The Court concludes that the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, Section 63-30-1 et seq. (U.C.A. 1953), bars every aspect of 
Rock Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint against the State 
Defendants. The State Defendants' involvement in this case con-
stituted a governmental function, and there has been no relevant, 
applicable waiver of immunity that would permit Rock Products to 
maintain a cause of action against the State Defendants. Rock 
Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint also fails to state a 
claim for reasons of law independent of sovereign immunity. 
3. Rock Products has no contract with the State and is not 
the intended beneficiary of a State contract, and therefore can-
not maintain its contract claims. Also, since the State Defen-
dants have no contractual obligation toward Rock Products, the 
Section 63-30-5 waiver of immunity for contracts does not apply, 
and Rock Products' contract claims are barred. 
- ( t *•* 
4. Rock Products1 tort claims do not state a cause of ac-
tion , and are also barred by immunity. Sections 63-30-3; 63-30-
4; and 63-30-10. 
5. Rock Products1 constitutional and statutory and civil 
rights claims fail because of sovereign immunity; and because 
Rock Products has failed to state a claim; and because, on the 
alleged facts, Rock Products cannot state a claim under the State 
or federal statutes or the Utah Constitution or the United States 
Constitution. 
6. As to the fifteenth cause of action. Rock Products has 
failed to comply with the notice requirements of Sections 63-30-
11 and -12. The statutory time for compliance and for filing 
additional claims has now expired. 
7. Rock Products has failed to comply with the bond require-
ment of Section 63-30-19. 
Having concluded as a matter of law that Rock Products1 Amen-
ded Third-Party Complaint does not and cannot state a cause of 
action against the State Defendants, and because Rock Products1 
claims are barred by sovereign immunity, 
THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERS: 
The State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted. 
Rock Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice, for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 1-6. 
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
Judgment is hereby entered against Third-Party Plaintiff Rock 
Products and in favor of Third-Party Defendants Utah Division of 
Water Resources, W. James Palmer, and Peter T. Lin (the State 
Defendants)• 
DATED this JJ^a&y of/Mk&pA. 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
H. Di/iOti H^/ i . iY 
C M * 




P. KEITH NELSON [A2391] 
DAVID L. BARCLAY [A0200] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Third-Party Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., * 
a Utah corporation, * 
* ORDER OF DISMISSAL 




VES A. KARREN d/b/a ROCK * 
PRODUCTS CO., and INTEGON * 
INDEMNITY CORPORATION, a * 
foreign corporation, * Civil No. C87-2390 
* 
Defendants. * Judge David S. Young 
* 
* 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK * 
PRODUCTS COMPANY, * 
* 






THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., * 
a Utah corporation, also * 
known as RICHARDS IRRIGATION * 





Based upon the stipulation of Plaintiff, The Richards 
Irrigation Company, its shareholders, Defendant Ves A. Karren dba 
Rock Products Company, Defendant Integon Indemnity Corporation, 
and third-party defendant Marvin L. Widerberg, and, in view of 
the Court's prior Orders dismissing claims against other third-
party defendants in these proceedings, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. All causes of action in these proceedings against 
The Richards Irrigation Company, against its shareholders, 
against Ves A. Karren dba Rock Products Company, against Integon 
Indemnity Corporation, and/or against Marvin L. Widerberg are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. However, nothing in this order 
or such dismissal shall preclude Mr. Karren or Integon from 
asserting any defense or counter-claim against any stockholder or 
director of The Richards Irrigation Company in the event such 
stockholder or director subsequently files and/or pursues suit 
against Mr. Karren or Integon arising out of the subject matter 
of the within litigation, although this order is not intended to 
consitute a determination that a stockholder or director would 
have the right to file or pursue such a suit. 
2. Due to the foregoing dismissal, this order and all 
other orders heretofore entered by this Court dismissing claims 
against other parties in these proceedings are hereby certified, 
2 
2503 
as of the date of this order and for purposes of appeal, as final 
orders pursuant to Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
DATED this (rAk day of 19 9^ 
The HtfrfdTable 
David S. Young 
D i s t r i c t Court JiJ 
TO FORM: 
for Plaintiff, 




Dtfvid W. Slaughter 





This Agreement entered into this /;# day of /IP^H* 1985, by and 
between the State of Utah, acting through the BOARD OF WATER RESOURCES, First 
Party, sometimes referred to herein as the STATE, and the RICHARDS IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a corporation, organized under the Laws of the State of Utah, Second 
Party, sometimes referred to herein as the WATER COMPANY: 
W I T N E S S E T H 
THAT WHEREAS, the Utah Legislature-has- authorized the BOARD DF WATER 
RESOURCES, under Title 73-10 Utah Code Annotated, to enter into contracts for 
the construction of water conservation projects which, in the opinion of the 
Board, will best conserve and utilize the water resources of the State of 
Utah; and 
WHEREAS, the STATE desires to promote a water conservation project, 
estimated to cost $375,000.00, and to provide 85% of the project cost from the 
Conservation and Development Fund for construction of a dual sprinkle 
/irrigation system, hereinafter referred to as the PROJECT and located in 
W Sections 27, 28, 28, 33, and 34, T2S, R1E, SLB&M in Salt Lake County, Utah; 
and 
WHEREAS, it is the desire of the WATER COMPANY to enter into a contract 
with the STATE, for a consideration to be hereinafter provided, and to use the 
water developed by the PROJECT, and as the WATER COMPANY has the available 
manpower and facilities necessary to construct the PROJECT, and is ready, 
willing, and able to enter into a contract for such purpose; 
NOW THEREFORE, the Parties hereto enter into this agreement and make-the 
following assignments: 
1. The WATER COMPANY hereby agrees to convey, grant, and warrant to the gi 
STATE, title, in fee simple as required, to the real estate upon which the s! 
structures are to be constructed; and further agrees to convey, grant, and c^ 
warrant to the STATE, title to such easements and rights-of-way as shall be £ 
necessary to enable the STATE to construct, maintain, and operate the PROJECT, o 
2. The WATER COMPANY hereby agrees to convey, assign, and warrant to ;*• 
the STATE, all right, title, and interest which it has or may have, to the {3 
right to the use of the water which shall be developed or conveyed through the $£ 
use of the PROJECT, and particularly the waters of Little Cottonwood Creek as w 
awarded to the Richards Irrigation Company in the Morse Decree No. 4802, dated 
June 16, 1910, Union and East Jordan Irrigation Company vs. Richards 
Irrigation Company, etal, in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah. 
3. The WATER COMPANY recognizes as valid the conveyance of easements 
and rights-of-way executed by various owners of the land to the STATE, and 
agrees that all performance by the WATER COMPANY unoer this contract shall be 
subservient to, and in recognition of, the aforesaid rights of the STATE in 
and to the aforesaid easements and rights-of-way, 
4. The WATER COMPANY agrees to supply the necessary manpower and 
facilities and agrees to complete the construction of the PROJECT regardless 
of unforeseen contingencies, in accordance with plans, specifications, and 
work items, a copy of which is hereby incorporated by reference and made a 
part hereof• 
5. The STATE agrees to pay to the WATER COMPANY Eighty-Five Percent 
(85%) of the total cost of constructing the PROJECT, but in no event shall the 
amount paid by the STATE exceed Three Hundred Nineteen Thousand Dollars 
($319,000.00), and the WATER COMPANY agrees to pay all costs in excess of the 
amount paid by the STATE. 
6. All payments made by the STATE to the WATER COMPANY under this 
agreement shall be made payable to RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY and mailed to 
Marvin L. Widerberg, President, 7970 South Highland Dr., Salt Lake City, Utah 
84121, Phone: 942-6412, or such person as may hereafter be designated by the 
WATER COMPANY. The WATER COMPANY shall, during the construction period under 
this agreement, establish in a bank of its choice, a special checking account 
for the PROJECT, and all monies from any source to be used for payment of 
obligations towards the construction work shall be deposited in this special 
account and dispersed by check to meet the obligations of the PROJECT 
construction. All items of labor and equipment shall be fully accounted for, 
and once each month the WATER COMPANY shall send to the DIVISION OF WATER 
RESOURCES a photocopy of each check issued from the said special account 
during the month. A copy of each Bank statement shall also be provided to the 
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES. 
7. It is further agreed that payment of the STATE1 S share of the 
construction costs shall be made periodically to the WATER COMPANY upon the 
presentation by the WATER COMPANY to the STATE of a certified statement of the 
payment requirement which shall be in the nature of a partial estimate of the 
work completed to date by the WATER COMPANY on each work item. The WATER 
COMPANY shall withhold Ten Percent (10%) of each payment to the construction 
contractor until Fifty Percent (5050 of the work has been completed, at which 
time the remaining partial payments may be made in full, if the work is 
progressing satisfactorily. " Also, . whenever the work is substantially 
complete, the amount withheld may be further reduced. The amounts withheld as 
set forth hereinabove shall be deposited by the WATER COMPANY in a separate 
interest-bearing account, with the interest accruing to the benefit of the 
contractors and subcontractors on a pro rata basis according to the work 
performed by each. The withholdings and the interest earned thereon shall 
become due and payable to the said contractors and subcontractors upon 
satisfactory completion of the construction work under this agreement, or 
sub-agreements, and upon final inspection and acceptance of the work by an 
engineer designated by the STATE. 
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8. It is further agreed that the WATER COMPANY shall complete the 
construction of the PR0J£CT~on or before March 1, 1987, and that title to the 
entire PROJECT, including all appurtenant facilities and water rights, shall 
immediately vest in the STATE, 
9. The STATE agrees to sell, and the WATER COMPANY agrees to purchase, 
the land, easements, rights-of-way, water rights, the constructed works, and 
all appurtenant facilities acquired by the STATE in this agreement and 
Assignments at a total purchase price defined to be the combined total of all 
funds paid by the STATE for the design and the construction of the PROJECT, 
but not to exceed Three Hundred Nineteen Thousand Dollars ($319,000.00), plus 
all expense incurred by the STATE for the investigation, engineering, and 
inspection of the PROJECT, plus interest on this total amount at the rate of 
Five Percent {5%). Interest shall accrue on the outstanding balance from the 
date of the first progress payment by the STATE. The actual cost of 
investigation, engineering, and inspection shall be determined by the STATE 
upon completion of the PROJECT. 
10. The purchase price as defined above shall be payable over a period 
of approximately Twenty (20) years, in annual installments as follows: 
Annual installments in the amount of Twenty-Six Thousand Dollars 
($26,000.00), or more, shall be due and payable on the First Day of March of 
each year commencing on March 1, 1988, and continuing until the purchase 
price, as defined above, shall have been paid in full. Said sums shall be 
payable at the office of the DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, and shall be applied 
first against the indebtedness incurred by the STATE for investigation, 
engineering, and inspection until fully paid, and then to interest and 
penalties and principal. Delinquent payments shall bear interest at a rate of 
Eighteen Percent (18%) per annum. 
11. During the purchase period, the WATER COMPANY may not change the use 
of-any PROJECT water or facilities from irrigation to industrial, municipal, 
or hydroelectric power generation without the written consent of the Board of 
Water Resources. The WATER COMPANY agrees that such consent may be 
conditional upon an amendment to this agreement to reflect a higher interest 
rate and/or a shorter repayment period for the outstanding balance due the 
STATE under this agreement. The terms of the amendment shall be negotiable 
between the Parties hereto* 
12* During the period of such purchase under this contract, provided the 
WATER COMPANY is not delinquent in any manner, the WATER COMPANY shall have 
and is hereby given the right to use the STATE'S water rights, and all 
facilities constructed thereunder. During the life of this agreement, the 
WATER COMPANY agrees to assume, at the WATER COMPANY'S expense, the full and 
complete obligation of maintaining the constructed works, and other 
facilities, and of protecting all water rights, easements, and rights-of-way 
from forfeiture, including the payment of any fees or assessments for said 
water rights, easements or rights-of-way. 
13. In order to secure the payment of the aforesaid purchase price, it 
is hereby expressly agreed that the STATE may require the WATER COMPANY to 
assess all outstanding shares of its stock for the full amount of any 
delinquencies in the aforesaid purchase installments. It is further agreed by 
the WATER COMPANY that it will not incur any mortgages or encumbrances, other 
than those already acquired by it, on any of its property, real or personal, 
without first securing the written consent of the STATE. 
14. The WATER COMPANY hereby warrants the STATE that the construction of 
the PROJECT will not interfere with existing water rights. If the PROJECT 
herein described shall give rise to a claim, or cause of action to any holoer 
of any water rights because of the interference with such rights by the 
operation of the PROJECT, then the WATER COMPANY hereby agrees to indemnify 
the STATE to the extent of such claim or cause of action. 
15. In constructing or causing the PROJECT to be constructed, the WATER 
COMPANY shall comply with the provisions of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
of 1965 and hereby agrees as follows: 
(a) The WATER COMPANY will not discriminate against any employee or 
applicant for employment because of race, color, sex, religion, 
ancestry, or national origin. 
(b) In all solicitations or advertisements for employees, the WATER 
COMPANY will state that all qualified applicants will receive 
consideration without regard to race, color, sex, religion, ancestry 
or national origin. 
(c) The WATER COMPANY will send to each labor union or workers 
representative notices to be provided, stating the WATER COMPANY'S 
responsibilities under the statute. 
(d) The WATER COMPANY will furnish such information and reports as 
requested by the Anti-Discrimination Division for the purpose of 
determining compliance with the statute. 
(e) Failure of the WATER COMPANY to comply with the statute, the 
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder and this 
non-discrimination clause shall be deemed a breach of this contract 
and it shall be cancelled, terminated or suspended in whole or in 
part. 
(f) The WATER COMPANY will include the provisions of Items (a) 
through (e) in every subcontract or purchase order (unless exempted 
under the statute or rules and regulations) so that such provisions 
will be binding upon such subcontractor or vendor. 
16. If either party to the contract violates any of the conditions or 
covenants made herein, the other may give written notice of such breach or ^ 
failure, and if the same shall not be cured within Ninety (90) days after such ?> 
notice, the other may declare the contract forfeited and may proceed to its £ 
remedies at law for such breach. £0 
en 
^ f \ « ^ 
17. The WATER COMPANY hereby agrees to indemnify and save harmless the 
STATE and its officers, agents, and employees from any and all liability in 
connection with this agreement, including any and all claims for injury or 
death of persons or animals, or for any property loss or damage that may arise 
from the construction, maintenance, or operation of the PROJECT. 
IB. After the WATER COMPANY shall have paid in full the purchase price, 
as defined above, the STATE shall execute such deeds and bills of sale as will 
be necessary to revest the same title to the aforesaid property and water 
rights in the WATER COMPANY. 
19. This agreement, or any part thereof, or the benefits to be received 
under this agreement, may not be the subject or any assignment to any person, 
firm, or corporation, by the said WATER COMPANY, without first having secured 
the written consent of the STATE to any such proposed assignment or 
disposition of this agreement. 
20. This agreement shall not become binding upon the STATE until it has 
been signed by all persons and agencies required by law, and the STATE shall 
not become liable to the WATER COMPANY for any commitments made by the WATER 
COMPANY until this agreement has been fully executed. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the State of Utah, acting through the BOARD OF 
RESOURCES, Party of the First Part, has caused these presents to be sionea\ 
the Chairman and Director of the said BOARD OF WATER RESOURCES by authority of 
a resolution of said Board; and the RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY, Party of the 
Second Part, has caused these presents to be signed and executed on its behalf 
by Marvin L. Widerberg, its President, and Clealon B. Mann, its Secretary, by 
authority of a resolution of its Stockholders at a meeting held September 17, 
1982. 
RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY 
I ' Presioent p - » J ^ 
2& 




# 7- 0+26 7&3 
Employer laentif ication No. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: J 
AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 
Divyision Buoger/'AccountTrreK 
APPROVED: ,DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE 
for Director of Finance 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
On the jt-tf day of 4P/2/L- , 1985, personally appeared before 
me Roy P. Une and D. Larry Anoerson, who being duly sworn did say that they 
are respect ively the Chairman and Director of the BOARD OF WATER RESOURCES, 
and that they signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of the said BOARD by 
authority of a resolution of said BOARD, and they also acknowledged to me that_ 
the said BOARD executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: //ax/ / £ , /f&T 
STATE OF UTAH } 
County of Salt Lake ) s s 
. / On the.? 22- day of Ci ;i ii ' . 1985, personally appeared before me 
'.iMibf'jjn, L. Widerberg and Clealon B. Mann, who being duly sworn did say that 
^> th'e'y-.ar* respectively the President and Secretary of the RICHARDS IRRIGATION 
v\^COKPWrt' and that they signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of said 
D\J£©rpof,ation by authority of a resolution of its Stockholders, and they also 
• *'acknowledged to jne that said Corporation executed the same. 
^^y'Cori&sion' Exp i re s: *-"^ . r 6 •, /*> £ £ 
/Wc'.\. ~ ^.AJ:* 
Notary Public 
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AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT 
This Amendment t o Agreement e n t e r e d i n t o t h i s &M day o f ^ f f 7 - ? ^ ^ * 
1986 , by and between t h e S t a t e o f Utah, a c t i n g through t h e BOARD OF WATER 
RESOURCES, F i r s t P a r t y , sometimes r e f e r r e d t o h e r e i n as t h e STATE, and t h e 
RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY, a c o r p o r a t i o n , o r g a n i z e d under t h e Laws o f t h e 
S t a t e of Utah, Second P a r t y , sometimes r e f e r r e d t o h e r e i n as t h e WATER COMPANY: 
W I T N E S S E T H 
WHEREAS, the Parties hereto did on April 4 , 1985, enter into a contract 
for the construction of a dual sprinkle irrigation system located in Sections 
27, 28, 29, 33, and 34, T2S, R1E, SLB&M, under which contract certain water 
rights , easements, and rights-of-way were conveyed to the STATE; and 
WHEREAS, the bids for the project were higher than the estimated cosl 
and the STATE desires to provide, from the Conservation and Development Fund 
part of the additional funds required to complete the project; and 
WHEREAS, i t i s the desire of the WATER COMPANY to amend the previou 
contract with the STATE, for a consideration to be hereinafter provided, fo 
the purpose of obtaining part of the additional funds reauired, and as th 
Parties are ready willing and able to enter into a contract for such purpose; 
NOW THEREFORE, by mutual consent of the Parties, the contract date 
April 4 , 1985 is hereby amended as follows: 
1. Paragraphs 5, 9, and 10 of the contract dated April 4 , 1985 ar 
hereby deleted and the following paragraphs 5, 9, and 10 substituted. 
"5. The STATE agrees to pay to the WATER COMPANY Eighty-Five Percei 
(852) of the total cost of constructing the PROJECT, but in no event shall tl 
amount paid by the STATE exceed Three Hundred Sixty-One Thousand Doll a' 
($361,000.00), which includes the additional Forty Two Thousand Dolla 
(342,000.00) provided hereunder, and the WATER COMPANY agrees to pay all cos 
in excess of the amount paid by the STATE." 
\l HAY £7 ZZUI FT? 
KATIE L , DI> 
RECORDER* SALT LAr.E COUNT 
sTATE Or UTAH HATUS& RE 
l i l t li TEHPLE SUITE SIB 
C » M* ****** •* * ^  • 
ZC'- PY» LT2Zr*r'* IPS* 
0879 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF *K-b 
RESOURCES, Party of the First P V A * V --, 
the Chairman and Director of the saic*Bo^L*oF v-. 
a resolution of said Board; and the RICHARDS IRR TIG\T1ON°^^ 
Second Part, has caused these presents to be signed and ex^uCecf 
by Marvin L. Widerberg, its Presiaent, and Clea~lon B. Mann, its 
authority of a resolution of its Stockholders at 
hPlri tf tT-^t****/*^,^ _ 1QS2. 
a meeting 
I v.* presToefti r-r- -
*•••' !•• S " ^ - ^ 
_,s><-L<cu. /A, , ^ ^ ^ . > ^ 
BOARD OF WATER RESOURCES 
Secretary 
87-0426703 




AVAILABLY OF FUNDS: 
> ^ ^ - •C 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
,4^r»:S 
Division Budget/Accounting 
APPROVED: DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE 
Assistant ^ttorpey General 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
fnanrp r WTTWance 
) ss 
On the ifjtf day of ^S&tt&rr^*^'* 1986, personally appeared before 
me Roy P. Urie and D. Larry Anoerson, who being duly sworn did say that they 
are respectively the Chairman and Director of the BOARD OF-WATER RESOURCES, 
and that they signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of the said BOARD by 
authority of a resolution of said BOARD, and they also acknowledged to me that 
the said BOARD executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: ffce//# S&?T~ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of SaJ£ La£* ) s s . 0 > < _ _ , 
On VmJ&tf day of
 Jrf&##*f' , 1986, personally appeared bei 
Marvin L. Widerberg and Clealon B. Mann, who being duly sworn did say that 
they are respectively the President and Secretary of the RICHARDS IRRIGATION 
COMPANY and that they signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of said 
Corporation by authority of a resolution of its Stockholders, and they also 
acknowledged to me that said Corporation executed the same. 




AMENDMENT-" TO AGREEMENT 
This Amendment to Agreement entered into this 3D#? day o f ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ € 
19#, by and between the State of Utah; acting througn the BOARD OF WATER 
RESOURCES, First Party, sometimes referred to herein as the STATE, and the 
RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation, organized under the Laws of the 
State of Utah, Second Party, sometimes referred to herein as the WATER COMPANY: 
W I T N E S S E T H 
WHEREAS, the Parties hereto did on April 4, 1985, and September 8, 1985 
enter into a contract and an amendment to said contract, respectively, for the 
construction of a dual sprinkle irrigation system located in Sections 27, 28, 
29, 33, and 34, T2S, R1E, SLB&M, under which contracts certain water rights, 
easements, and rights-of-way were conveyed to the STATE; and 
WHEREAS, due to unforseen circumstances the cost of the project exceeded 
the bid price and additional funds will be recuired for completion, and the 
STATE desires to provide part of the additional funds from the Conservation 
and Development Fund; and 
WHEREAS, i t is the desire of the WATER COMPANY to amend the previous 
contract with the STATE, for a consideration to be hereinafter provided, for 
the purpose of obtaining part of the additional funds required, and as the 
Parties are ready willing and able to enter into a contract for such purpose; 
NOW THEREFORE, by mutual consent of the Parties, the contract dated 
April 4, 1985 and amended September 8, 1986 is hereby amended as follows: 
1 . Paragraphs 5, 9, and 10 of the contract dated April 4, 1985 as 
amended September 8, 1986, are hereby deleted and the following paragraphs 5, 
9, and 10 substituted. 
M5. The STATE agrees to pay to the WATER COMPANY Eighty-Five Percent 
(855b) of the total cost of constructing the PROJECT, but in no event shall the 
amount Raid by the STATE exceed Four Hundred Sixty-One Thousand Dollars 
(3461,000.00), which includes an additional One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
(5100,000.00) provided hereunder, and the WATER COMPANY agrees to pay all 
costs in excess of the amount paid by the STATE.11 
T n 5 T A T , „,ees to ^ . ^ r S E S ^ ••a The 5i^»- l„wtQ-of-way, *axer
 t t n s a g r e e ^ + n * - i 0 f a l* 
« S S B * « J *••.«™. „...,rr.s asss •. 
MO. The !»«*»:,&?*£« l»» >"rs* " 
U37.0^tn-er^yU^--;n9on-;arc^ 
*• « : s ^ u a « y ^ d s e p t e m b e r 
dated April A, 1985, 
— i „-F-fPCt. * 
0PP3 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the sx^iT— 
RESOURCES, Party of the First Part, h ^ U u L r v * — 
the Chairman and Director of the said BOARD OF WATIR RESOURCC" V~ — 
a resolution of said Board; and the RICHARDS IRRIGATION coMPANY^a^t^VV'^' 
Second Part, has caused these presents to be signed and executed on its behalf 
by Marvin L. Widerberg, its President, and Clealon B. Mann, its Secretary, by 
authority of a resolution of its Stockholders at a meeting 
held .S.^mf^r J 7 ltf. 
RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY 
President r ^ s ^ 
Secretary ^L. 
87-0426703 
Employer laentification No. 
BOARD OF WATER RESOURCES 
Chairman 
V / Director ,—_ __—. M B u i d Q A t o i / Director 
AVAILABILITY 0E FUNDS 
Division Budget/Accounting 
APPROVED: 
for Directpr^f Finance 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) " 
On the 3£>#, day of ££CJE/f£&L
 9 1986, personally appeared before 
me Roy P. Urie and D. Larry Anderson, who being duly sworn did say that they 
are respectively the Chairman and Director of the BOARD OF WATER-RESOURCES, 
and that they signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of the said BOARD by 
authority of a resolution of said BOARD, and they also acknowledged to me that, 
the said BOARD executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: /fdf '9, '900 
) STATE OF UTAH 
County of ) ss 
On thejg*^ day of Dfce«*A&£ t 1986, personally appeared before me 
Marvin L. Widerberg and Clealon B. Mann, who being duly sworn did say that '' . 
they are respectively the President and Secretary of the RICHARDS IRRIGATION*.-
COMPANY and that they signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of said . * 2 & ^ — y ^ 
Corporation by authority of a resolution of its Stockholders, and they also *\*i*£p& 
acknowledged to me that said Corporation executed the same. * h 
c 
> -
My Commission Expires t , ^ ^ , 7 ?. /Gfy 
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Notary Public vr 
